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What They Can Do About It: Prison Administrators’ 
Authority to Force-Feed Hunger-Striking Inmates 
Tracey M. Ohm* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prison inmates throughout history have employed hunger strikes 
as a means of opposition to authority.1 Inmates engage in hunger 
strikes for a variety of reasons, often in an attempt to gain leverage 
against prison officials2 or garner attention for the inmate’s plight or 
cause.3 Suicide is a motivating factor for some inmates.4 When a 
 
 * J.D. Candidate (2007), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. The author 
wishes to thank Professor Margo Schlanger for her guidance and expertise. 
 1. This Note examines hunger strikes undertaken by competent prison inmates. Analysis 
of hunger strikes by incompetent individuals or nonprisoners invokes different considerations. 
For more information about these differences, see Julie Levinsohn Milner, Dignity or Death 
Row: Are Death Row Rights to Die Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the 
Terminally Ill and the Terminally Sentenced?, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
279 (1998). 
 2. B. JAYE ANNO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: GUIDELINES 
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AN ADEQUATE DELIVERY SYSTEM 85 (2001); see also Illinois ex 
rel. Ill. Dep’t of Corr. v. Millard, 782 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (listing motivating 
reasons for an inmate’s hunger strike as protest of a transfer, protest of treatment while in 
prison, and protest of continued imprisonment with an intent to continue strike until he was 
transferred back, released, or dead); Georgian Prisoners End Hunger Strike, RUSS. & CIS GEN. 
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 12, 2006, available at http://www.lexis.com (reporting prison hunger strikes 
had been organized by heads of criminal groups who were trying to exert control over inmates). 
 3. 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 224–25 (3d ed. 2002); see also Zant 
v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Ga. 1982) (stating reason for prisoner’s hunger strike was his 
desire to be transferred to North Carolina due to fear for his life inside the Georgia prison 
system); Mason Stockstill, Four Inmates Claim Hunger Strike for Poor Conditions, SUN (San 
Bernardino, Cal.), Dec. 29, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com (featuring prison 
administrators explaining that prisoners sometimes declare themselves to be on hunger strikes 
despite the fact that they are still eating).  
 4. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 224–25; see also Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 809 
(R.I. 1995) (“In respect to an incarcerated prisoner, we believe that there is no right under either 
the State or the Federal Constitution to override the compelling interest of the state in the 
preservation of his or her life and the prevention of suicide.”); cf. Steven C. Bennett, Note, The 
Privacy and Procedural Due Process Rights of Hunger Striking Prisoners, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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hunger strike progresses to the stage where the inmate’s health or life 
is in danger prison officials are faced with the decision whether to 
force-feed the inmate.5 In the majority of situations, prison 
administrators only intervene when the hunger strike becomes life-
threatening.6 Scholarly discussions of the subject of force-feeding 
invariably include an examination of conflicting interests: the 
concerns of prison administrators (often defined in terms of the 
state’s interest) in contrast with the rights of the inmate engaging in 
the hunger strike.7 By far the most media attention about hunger 
strikes in recent history has been focused on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
Beginning in July 2005 detainees held in Guantanamo Bay by the 
United States conducted mass hunger strikes in protest of the purpose 
and conditions of their imprisonment.8 Prison hunger strikes are 
occasionally reported by the news media if they involve a large 
number of inmates or an infamous prisoner. For example, in August 
 
1157, 1157 n.1 (1983) (listing four “sometimes overlapping categories” of hunger strikes). 
 5. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 225. There are three main methods of force-feeding: 
nasogastric tube feeding, intravenous feeding, and gastrotomy (“direct surgical access to the 
stomach”). Bennett, supra note 4, at 1176–77. Nasogastric tube feeding is the most common 
method. Id. 
 6. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 225.  
 7. Id.; see also D. Sneed & H. Stonecipher, Prisoner Fasting as Symbolic Speech: The 
Ultimate Speech-Action Test, 32 HOW. L.J. 549, 551–60 (1989) (examining how courts have 
balanced “the expression and privacy claims of the fasting prisoner” and the state’s interests); 
Richard Ansbacher, Note, Force-Feeding Hunger Striking Prisoners: A Framework for 
Analysis, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 99, 100 (1983) (“The individual’s constitutional rights in 
preventing a forced feeding will be examined in juxtaposition to the state interests.”); Bennett, 
supra note 4, at 1163–64 (recommending a hearing before force-feeding where a “judge should 
balance the inmate’s right to privacy–as well as other individual rights that may be implicated 
by force-feeding–against the state’s potentially compelling interest in maintaining prison 
security”); Joel K. Greenberg, Note, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The Constitutionality of Force-
Feeding, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 748–65 (1983) (comparing “bodily integrity” against a 
“compelling state interest”); Glen Allan Ludwig, Note, Hunger Striking: Freedom of Choice or 
the State’s Best Interest?, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 169, 174–81 (1984) 
(discussing the “state’s interest in preserving life” and the “compentent person’s right to refuse 
life-sustaining treatment”). 
 8. Mike Mount, Hunger Strike at Guantanamo Grows, CNN.COM, Sept. 13, 2005, 
http://cnn.com/2005/WORLD/americas/09/13/gitmo.strike; see also Charlie Savage, 46 
Guantanamo Detainees Join Hunger Strike, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 2005, at A2; Jane Sutton, 
75 Prisoners Join in Hunger Strike at U.S. Base at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, May 30, 
2006, at A7 (reporting that the recent hunger striking detainees join a few who have been 
refusing food since August 2005); Letta Taylor, ‘People Will Definitely Die’; Guantanamo 
Inmates Resolute in Second Month of Hunger Strike, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 
2005, at A14. 
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2005 a judge in Montgomery County, Maryland ordered force-
feeding for Washington, D.C., sniper John Allen Muhammad to end 
his hunger strike in protest of a prison transfer.9 Even former dictator 
Saddam Hussein engaged in several hunger strikes during his trial for 
war crimes in Iraq, the longest resulting in voluntary feeding through 
a tube.10  
This Note will examine the authority allocated to prison 
administrators in the United States to force-feed hunger striking 
inmates. It will explore the guidelines provided to administrators by 
the judicial system, penological organizations, and legislative bodies. 
Part II examines three sources presently in place from which prison 
administrators can derive guidance on when and how to respond to 
hunger-striking inmates: the courts, penological organizations, and 
legislation. 
Part III analyzes the adequacy of the authorization given to prison 
administrators dealing with inmate hunger strikes. Part IV proposes 
that because the majority of guidelines, laws, and judicial rulings 
allow for prison intervention in cases of hunger striking inmates, 
prison authorities could benefit from greater standardization in the 
area of hunger strike response. It further proposes that the Turner 
rule, which presents a framework for determining to what degree 
prison administrators can infringe on inmates’ constitutional rights, is 
applicable to hunger striking inmates. Further, a leading penological 
organization such as the ACA should develop a set of standards on 
hunger strike response that uses Turner as a basis to ensure 
constitutional validity. These standards should then be adopted by 
state legislatures and the federal Bureau of Prisons. Alternatively, the 
 
 9. Allan Lengel, Sniper Goes on Hunger Strike, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2005, at B1 
(quoting Judge James L. Ryan as saying Muhammad was “‘in imminent danger of very serious 
bodily harm, including death, if he does not begin to receive nourishment within the next 
several days’”); see also Convicted Sniper ‘Must Be Fed’, BBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/4186638.stm (noting that Muhammad was 
“reportedly upset with the food he was being served in Maryland and the handling of his legal 
material”); Tarron Lively, Lawyer Expects Hunger Strike to End, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, 
at A9. A hunger strike by Iraqi prisoners in December 2005 led to an altercation with British 
soldiers when soldiers tried to force the prisoners to end their hunger strike to coincide with 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to Basra. Prisoners Clash with British Guards Over Hunger 
Strike, BBC INT’L REP., Dec. 28, 2005, available at http://www.westlaw.com. 
 10. Julian E. Barnes & Zainab Hussein, Hussein is Hospitalized, Being Fed After 
Collapse, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2006, at A6. 
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Bureau of Prisons should use the Turner framework to supplement 
existing procedures.  
II. EXAMINATION OF AUTHORIZATION AND DIRECTION PROVIDED TO 
PRISON AUTHORITIES IN REGARD TO INMATE HUNGER STRIKES 
Hunger strikes have long been a tool of protest for prisoners 
throughout the world.11 In the United States, hunger strikes gained 
notoriety in 1917 with suffragists who were jailed for their protests in 
support of women’s voting rights.12 Taking a page from British 
suffragists who had some success with the tactic,13 many of the 
women who were jailed went on hunger strikes to protest their 
imprisonment.14 Prison officials responded by force-feeding the 
hunger-striking suffragists three times a day.15  
Several decades later the actions of Irish paramilitary prisoners 
brought world-wide media attention to the practice of hunger 
strikes.16 In 1981 members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) held 
in British prisons engaged in hunger strikes demanding treatment as 
 
 11. Mara Silver, Note, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self-
Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2005). Prisons in Turkey have frequently seen hunger 
strikes by groups of prisoners. Id. at 634–35. For a description of the experience of a physician 
dealing with a hunger-striking prisoner in a Turkish prison, see N.Y. Oguz and S.H. Miles, The 
Physician and Prison Hunger Strikes: Reflecting on the Experience in Turkey, 31 J. MED. 
ETHICS 169 (2005). 
 12. Sally Hunter Graham, Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage 
Movement, 98 POL. SCI. Q. 665, 676 (1983). National Woman’s Party leader Alice Paul 
“managed to smuggle notes describing her treatment to Woman’s Party members outside the 
jail. In her messages, she demanded to be treated as a political prisoner, a strategy calculated to 
provoke public sympathy for the alleged ‘victims of political oppression’ and thus to embarrass 
the Wilson administration.” Id. 
 13. “[Alice Paul’s] plan was based on a tactic used to great effect by British militant 
suffragists: Paul and the other suffrage prisoners would refuse to eat.” Id.  
 14. Janice L. Richter, We Have Waited So Long: The Story of Alice Paul, N.J. LAW. 
(South Plainfield, N.J.), Sept. 1995, at 25, 28.  
 15. Id. Force-feeding through nasogastric tube was an experience that Alice Paul, head of 
the National Woman’s Party, feared “dreadfully.” Id. In Paul’s words, “One feels so forsaken 
when one lies prone and people shove a pipe down one’s stomach.” DORIS STEVENS, JAILED 
FOR FREEDOM 189 (1920); see also SOPHIA A. VAN WINGERDEN, THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 
MOVEMENT IN BRITAIN, 1866–1928 91 (1999) (British suffragists were also force-fed, and 
several died as a result.); Graham, supra note 12, at 676. 
 16. BBC on This Day: 3 October, 1981, IRA Maze Hunger Strikes at an End, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/3/newsid_2451000/2451503.stm (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/6
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“special category status” prisoners.17 Prison authorities did not 
intervene, and the media zealously covered the situation as ten IRA 
inmates starved themselves to death.18 This proved to be one of the 
most famous incidents of hunger striking to date.19 
When faced with an inmate on a hunger strike, prison 
administrators in the United States can look to three main sources for 
guidance on when and how to respond. One source is the courts, as 
they have determined how much control inmates maintain over their 
bodies and lives while in prison. Another is penological 
organizations, which can provide standards of inmate care. The third 
is legislation, as state and federal governments weigh in on inmate 
rights. 
A. Judicial Attempts to Define Prisoner Rights in Hunger Strike 
Situations 
The United States courts did not attempt to define the rights of a 
hunger-striking inmate in a reported decision until 1982.20 From the 
beginning, courts were split over whether individual rights trumped 
state interests. First, the Supreme Court of Georgia held in Zant v. 
Prevatte21 that an inmate could starve himself to death as a result of a 
hunger strike and the state could not interfere by force-feeding him.22 
The court said that although “[t]he State has a duty to prisoners in its 
custody to keep them safe from harm and to render medical aid when 
necessary,” an inmate, “by virtue of his right of privacy, can refuse to 
 
 17. Daniel F. Mulvihill, The Legality of the Pardoning of Paramilitaries Under the Early 
Release Provisions of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 227, 
232–33 (2001). “Special category status” was a kind of prisoner of war status the British 
government extended to prisoners committing “scheduled terrorist-type” crimes. Id. at 231. 
Irish Republican Army prisoner Bobby Sands began his hunger strike to reinstate special 
category status five years after its end. Id. at 232. 
 18. BBC on This Day, supra note 16. 
 19. Silver, supra note 11, at 635. 
 20. Ansbacher, supra note 7, at 99, 99 n.5 (listing three unreported cases that find a 
prisoner has no right to commit suicide by starvation while in custody).  
 21. Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982). 
 22. Id. at 716. Inmate Prevatte began his hunger strike to gain the attention of prison 
administrators because he wished to be transferred out of the Georgia Prison System. Id. 
Prevatte felt “his life [was] in danger from other inmates” as a result of “conflicts which 
developed while he was at Reidsville [Prison].” Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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allow intrusions on his person, even though calculated to preserve his 
life.”23  
Later the same year, in State ex rel. White v. Narick,24 the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, although considering 
the reasoning in Zant,25 disagreed and held that an inmate did not 
have the right to starve himself to death.26 Instead, the court held, 
“West Virginia’s interest in preserving life is superior to White’s 
personal privacy (severely modified by his incarceration) and 
freedom of expression right.”27  
Two years later, in In re Caulk,28 the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire found that, “the State’s interests in maintaining an 
effective criminal justice system” outweighed an inmate’s right to 
engage in a hunger strike leading to his death.29 The dissent in Caulk 
argued that the case was distinguishable from White because Caulk’s 
 
 23. Id. at 716–17 (citations omitted). “The State has no right to monitor this man’s 
physical condition against his will; neither does it have the right to feed him to prevent his 
death from starvation if that is his wish.” Id. at 716. The court made its ruling after noting, 
“Prevatte is not [mentally] incompetent, nor does he have dependents who rely on him for a 
means of livelihood.” Id. at 717. This statement may be a reflection of the court’s consideration 
of the parens patriae doctrine. Ansbacher, supra note 7, at 109 n.94. This doctrine requires the 
state to step into the role of a parent for someone who is mentally incompetent, and may forbid 
someone who has children to kill themselves, thus leaving the child without a parent. Id. at 
108–09. 
 24. State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982). 
 25. The court said, “The Georgia court failed to consider compelling reasons for 
preserving life, not the least being civility.” Id. at 57. 
 26. Id. at 58. White embarked on his hunger strike to protest the conditions at the state 
penitentiary where he was incarcerated, and as a result lost more than one hundred pounds over 
a period of five months. Id. at 55. 
 27. Id. at 58. The court also noted that White had given up his hunger strike before the 
case was decided. Id. at 55 n.1. The court rendered a decision despite this fact “because it [was] 
capable of repetition.” Id.; see also Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626–27 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1982) (distinguishing desire to commit suicide from right to refuse medical 
treatment, and holding that the interests of the state outweigh any claimed rights of Chapman, 
serving a sentence for the murder of former Beatle John Lennon, to prevent prison 
administrators from force-feeding him to end his hunger strike). For an analysis of Zant, White, 
and Von Holden, see Ansbacher, supra note 7, at 100–02.  
 28. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984). 
 29. Id. at 97. Caulk was serving a life sentence in prison and decided to quit eating so he 
could die instead of living the rest of his life behind bars. The court said, “The State’s interest in 
the preservation of human life and the prevention of suicide are also implicated in this 
situation.” Id. at 96. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol23/iss1/6
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motivation was death rather than manipulation of the penal system, 
and that the inmate should be permitted to die.30  
Over the five years following Zant only a small number of other 
courts considered the issue of force-feeding prison inmates.31 In 1987 
the United States Supreme Court, in Turner v. Safley,32 introduced a 
test to determine when prison administrators have the right to infringe 
on the constitutional rights of inmates.33 The Turner test requires that 
prison administrators show the infringement is “reasonably related” 
to “legitimate penological interests” in preventing the inmates from 
exercising their rights.34 In order to determine whether a policy is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, the Court 
looked to four factors: (1) a “valid rational connection” between the 
regulation and the governmental interest put forth to justify it; (2) an 
“alternative means of exercising the right” available to the prisoner; 
(3) the “impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right 
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison 
resources generally”; and (4) the “absence [or presence] of ready 
 
 30. Id. at 98 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The majority said, “[Caulk] has purposely selected 
this method of dying so that he can remain competent. He wants to think, to feel and to 
understand his death. He insists that he is not committing suicide but rather is allowing himself 
to die.” Id. at 94 (majority opinion). The dissent argued, “The State is not being manipulated in 
such instances as it may be if political or private demands are being sought by a hunger strike.” 
Id. at 100 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Sneed & Stonecipher, supra note 7, at 556–60 
(analyzing cases in terms of hunger strikes as symbolic speech). 
 31. See In re Sanchez, 577 F. Supp. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (upholding order for force-
feeding because prisoner’s reason behind hunger strike was to put pressure on judge who would 
hear his motion to vacate a contempt order); Von Holden, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 627 (holding that 
prisoner’s First Amendment right did not extend to suicide). 
 32. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987). 
 33. Id. Turner was based on challenges to a Missouri prison mail policy restricting “non-
family, non-legal correspondence” at the discretion of prison administrators and a marriage 
regulation forbidding inmates to marry without the prison superintendent’s permission, given 
only with “compelling reason.” Id. at 81–82. The Court held that, “a lesser standard of scrutiny 
is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules” than the strict scrutiny 
standard applied by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 81. 
 34. Id. at 89. In the course of developing the reasonableness test, the Court identified two 
principles first set out in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974): “The first of these 
principles is that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison 
inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. “A second principle identified in Martinez, however, is the 
recognition that ‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison 
administration and reform.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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alternatives” for prison administrators.35 Turner’s four-part test has 
been applied to a variety of prison regulation challenges since its 
creation.36  
Despite the influence of Turner on cases concerning inmate rights, 
modern courts are split on the issue of force-feeding for hunger 
strikes.37 The majority of cases still permit force-feeding, holding that 
state and prison interests outweigh the inmate’s right to hunger 
strike.38 Within this majority, two Illinois state courts have 
considered the Turner decision in the process of analyzing an 
inmate’s right not to be force-fed to end his hunger strike. In Illinois 
ex rel. Illinois Department of Corrections v. Millard39 the Illinois 
Court of Appeals loosely framed the situation of a hunger-striking 
inmate in terms of the Turner test, and expressly disagreed with the 
 
 35. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91. In Turner, the Court found that there was a legitimate 
penological interest in banning inmate-to-inmate correspondence. Id. at 91. “The prohibition on 
correspondence is reasonably related to valid corrections goals. The rule is content neutral, it 
logically advances the goals of institutional security and safety identified by Missouri prison 
officials, and it is not an exaggerated response to those objectives.” Id. at 93. The Court also 
held that the prison’s regulation prohibiting inmates from marrying was not supported by 
legitimate penological interests. Id. at 91. “No doubt legitimate security concerns may require 
placing reasonable restrictions upon an inmate’s right to marry, and may justify requiring 
approval of the superintendent. The Missouri regulation, however, represents an exaggerated 
response to such security objectives.” Id. at 97–98. 
 36. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132–36 (2003) (prisoner visitation policy 
found to be reasonable); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223–27 (1990) (antipsychotic 
medication policy found to be reasonable); Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732–35 (4th Cir. 
2002) (policy forbidding homosexual male inmates from sharing double-occupancy cells found 
to be reasonable); Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 548–49 (4th Cir. 1999) (opening of outgoing 
mail found to be reasonable); Roe v. Crawford, 439 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953 (W.D. Mo. 2006) 
(policy forbidding transportation for nontherapeutic abortions found to not be reasonable); 
Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (co-payment requirement for 
kosher meals found to not be reasonable); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 732–33 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (“red sticker” policy of automatically segregating HIV-positive inmates 
found to not be reasonable). 
 37. Compare Singletary v. Costello, 665 So.2d 1099, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding “Costello, as a prison inmate, had the legal right to refuse medical treatment where the 
need for treatment stemmed from a self-induced hunger strike”), with Illinois ex rel. Ill. Dep’t 
of Corr. v. Millard, 782 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding “the Department may 
force-feed a hunger-striking inmate, whose only purpose is to attempt to manipulate the system 
so as to avoid disruptive or otherwise detrimental effects to the orderly administration of our 
prison system”). 
 38. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 225. 
 39. Millard, 782 N.E.2d 966. 
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holding in Zant.40 The court determined the Department’s interest in 
controlling “an orderly and disciplined institution” outweighed the 
inmate’s rights when the inmate’s intent was to manipulate the prison 
system.41 Another appellate court case in Illinois, People ex rel. 
Department of Corrections v. Fort,42 applied the Turner test to force-
feeding, holding that “‘the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, 
and the enforcement of prison security, order, and discipline’ are 
legitimate penological interests.”43 
In contrast, in 1993 the Supreme Court of California, in Thor v. 
Superior Court,44 denied a petition from a prison physician holding 
that a quadriplegic inmate had the right to refuse medical treatment, 
including food administered by force.45 The court found that prison 
health care administrators had no duty to provide further treatment 
after the inmate’s refusal.46 In 1996 the District Court of Appeal of 
 
 40. Id. at 971–72. “The Georgia court failed to consider compelling penological 
objectives such as the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, and the enforcement of prison 
security, order, and discipline. We not only acknowledge those interests . . . but hold that they 
are superior to the constitutional rights asserted by defendant in this case.” Id.  
 41. Id. at 972. 
 42. People ex rel. Dep’t of Corr. v. Fort, 815 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 43. Id. at 1250 (quoting Millard, 782 N.E.2d at 971). The court goes on to say, “Further, 
these interests are superior to the constitutional rights of an inmate whose hunger strike is an 
attempt to manipulate [the Department of Corrections].” Fort, 815 N.E.2d at 1250. Fort, who 
began his hunger strike to “protest[] his transfer to and treatment at” Pontiac Correctional 
Center, declared that he wished to maintain control over his life and death, and adamantly 
claimed that although his hunger strike might kill him, he was not suicidal. Id. at 1249–50. 
 44. Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993). 
 45. Id. at 378–79. 
 46. Id. at 390. The court said,  
In summary, we conclude that a competent, informed adult, in the exercise of self-
determination and control of bodily integrity, has the right to direct the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, even at the risk of death, which 
ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interest. The right does not depend upon 
the nature of the treatment refused or withdrawn; nor is it reserved to those suffering 
from terminal conditions. Once a patient has declined further medical intervention, the 
physician's duty to provide such care ceases. 
Id. at 387. The Court also considered the restrictions on Thor’s patient as a prisoner, but 
determined,  
Thus, [w]hile both of the . . . state interests in life are certainly strong, in themselves 
they will usually not foreclose a competent person from declining life-sustaining 
medical treatment . . . . This is because the life that the state is seeking to protect in 
such a situation is the life of the same person who has competently decided to forego 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p151 Ohm book pages.doc  3/29/2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 23:151 
 
 
Florida agreed with Thor and the earlier case of Zant in Singletary v. 
Costello: “Costello’s privacy right to refuse medical intervention 
must be balanced against only the state interest in the preservation of 
life. This interest, in and of itself, cannot overcome the fundamental 
nature of Costello’s privacy right.”47 
In 2005 the Court of Appeals of Washington said in McNabb v. 
Department of Corrections48 that the Department of Corrections 
“may force-feed a starving inmate, whose actions are undertaken with 
the intent to cause his own death and have the potential of disrupting 
the internal order of our prison system.”49 The court did not apply the 
Turner test to reach their decision. 
 
the medical intervention; it is not some other actual or potential life that cannot 
adequately protect itself.  
Id. at 384 (citations omitted); see also April Lerman, California Supreme Court Survey: 
October 1992—October 1993: Health and Safety Law, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 646–47 (1994) 
(suggesting that future courts will use the balancing test in Thor to determine when a patient 
can refuse medical treatment); Shirley A. Padmore, Comment, California’s Limits on the Right 
to Refuse Life-Saving Treatment—“No Holds Barred?” Thor v. Superior Court, 46 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 369, 380 (1994) (concluding, “Thor opens the door to erosion of prison 
interests vis-à-vis the interests of prisoners”). 
 47. Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The court 
employed the same three-part analysis as Thor, first determining whether Costello had a 
constitutional right to decide whether to stop eating, then analyzing that right in light of his 
status as a prisoner, and finally balancing that right against the prison’s concerns. Id. at 1103–
09. The court considered, but found no compelling state interest in the prevention of suicide, 
protection of third parties, maintenance of the ethical integrity, or maintenance of an orderly 
and secure penal institution. Id. Thus the only consideration was the state’s interest in the 
preservation of life. Id. at 1110. However, the court also said, “Our resolution of this case 
should not be interpreted as universally holding that a prison inmate has the right to starve to 
death.” Id. 
 48. McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 112 P.3d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 49. Id. at 595. McNabb claimed that force-feeding was an unconstitutional invasion of his 
privacy. Id. at 593. The court distinguished the otherwise healthy McNabb’s conscious decision 
not to eat from a situation “where he is suffering from a terminal and incurable illness and thus 
chooses to avoid highly invasive and intrusive procedures to postpone his death.” Id. at 595; see 
also Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 1995) (holding that the state’s interests 
outweigh the prisoners’ right to continue a hunger strike); Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 
A.2d 887, 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (holding that interests of the commonwealth in prison 
security, order, and discipline combined with duty to provide medical care “clearly outweigh 
any diminished right to privacy held by Kallinger”). 
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B. Penological Organization Efforts to Set Standards for the Care of 
Hunger-Striking Inmates 
There are several organizations that develop standards for health 
care within penal institutions. The American Correctional 
Association (ACA)50 publishes a guide called Performance-Based 
Standards for Correctional Health Care in Adult Correctional 
Institutions.51 This guide does not specifically address the issue of 
force-feeding or proper hunger strike response.52 The standards in the 
guide regarding unwanted medical care defer to applicable state and 
federal law.53 The ACA also publishes Standards for Adult 
Correctional Institutions,54 which addresses hunger strikes under the 
heading “Threats to Security” and recommends a written plan to deal 
with “situations that threaten institutional security.”55 The standard 
gives a general outline, but does not elaborate on the specific 
procedures recommended for the written plan.56 
 
 50. According to its website, the ACA is “the oldest and largest international correctional 
association in the world.” American Correctional Association, http://www.aca.org (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2007). 
 51. AM. CORR. ASS’N, PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS FOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH 
CARE IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2002). The purpose behind the development of 
these standards “was not only to create standards that ensure higher quality health care 
programs but also to give agencies a self-monitoring system that would give clinical and 
correctional managers usable information.” Id. at vii. The ACA “continues its mission of 
improving practices in correctional facilities by helping agencies provide incarcerated 
populations with safe and effective health care.” Id. 
 52. The ACA standards include a section on “Informed Consent,” which may be 
applicable to force-feeding. The section states, “When health care is rendered against the 
patient’s will, it is in accordance with state and federal laws and regulations. Otherwise, any 
offender may refuse (in writing) medical, dental, and mental health care.” Id. at 30. 
 53. Id. 
 54. AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 
2003). A Bureau of Justice Statistics questionnaire gives insight into how penological 
organizations categorize hunger strikes. It asks state and federal prisoners to rate the number of 
occurrences of various situations in their facility. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, THE SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND THE SURVEY 
OF INMATES IN FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES QUESTIONNAIRE (1999).  
 55. “Such situations include but are not limited to riots, hunger strikes, disturbances, and 
taking of hostages.” AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 54, at 62.  
 56. “The plans should designate the personnel who are to implement the procedures, when 
and which authorities and media should be notified, how the problem should be contained, and 
the procedures to be followed after the incident is quelled.” Id. 
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Another influential organization is the National Commission on 
Correctional Health Care (NCCHC).57 It publishes several sets of 
penological standards including, most relevantly, Standards for 
Health Services in Prisons.58 Like the ACA standards, the NCCHC 
standards do not contain provisions for dealing with hunger strikes or 
administering food by force.59 The NCCHC provision about the right 
to refuse treatment acknowledges that the law regarding consent 
differs between states and recommends the development of a policy 
based on the applicable laws.60 
Although the NCCHC standards do not address hunger strikes or 
force-feeding61 another NCCHC publication, Correctional Health 
Care: Guidelines for the Management of an Adequate Delivery 
System, does contain a section on hunger strikes.62 These guidelines 
recognize an inmate’s right to refuse treatment, saying “[f]orce-
feeding the inmate clearly would violate his or her wishes and 
concepts of patient autonomy.”63 These guidelines also identify the 
 
 57. According to its website, NCCHC is an organization that “is committed to improving 
the quality of health care in jails, prisons, and juvenile confinement facilities.” National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care, http://www.ncchc.org/about/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2007). 
 58. NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN 
PRISONS (2003). This publication is a revised version of standards the American Medical 
Association first published in 1979. Id. at vii. The standards represent “NCCHC’s 
recommended minimum requirements for prison health services.” Id. at viii. The organization 
says, “Once implemented, the standards can lead to increased efficiency of health services 
delivery, greater organizational effectiveness, better overall health protection for inmates, 
reduced risk of liability related to health services, and NCCHC health services accreditation.” 
Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 133–34. The “Right to Refuse Treatment” standard states, “An inmate may 
refuse specific health evaluations and treatments.” Id. at 133. The standard mentions that one 
alternative to be explored in the case where an inmate is refusing treatment is to “seek a court 
order forcing treatment, but only if the individual’s clinical condition warrants such an extreme 
measure.” Id. 
 61. ANNO, supra note 2, at 85. “None of the sets of national standards specifically 
addresses hunger strikes.” Id. 
 62. The guidelines state, “Although [hunger strikes] are rare in corrections, health 
professionals often seek guidance when confronted with them.” Id. 
 63. Id. The section provides, 
It is recommended that serious hunger strikes (i.e., those lasting more than 2 or 3 days) 
be supervised by an interdisciplinary committee of correctional and noncorrectional 
personnel. A committee formed to scrutinize life-threatening refusals of care also 
might be appropriate for this task. If the committee agrees that the inmate has made a 
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point when the patient is comatose as the truly controversial area.64 
The guidelines seem to suggest that NCCHC supports the view that 
inmate rights outweigh institutional concerns up to (and possibly 
beyond) the point where the inmate slips into a coma.65 
In the case of “detainees,” as opposed to prisoners, the guidelines 
are much more developed. The Detention Standards of the former 
United States Immigration and Nationalization Services (INS)66 
apply to detainees held in “[s]ervicing [p]rocessing [c]enters,” 
“[c]ontract [d]etention [f]acilities,” and “[s]tate or local government 
facilities used by INS through Intergovernmental Service Agreements 
to hold detainees for more than 72 hours.”67 The standards include a 
set of guidelines for hunger strikes.68 They require close monitoring 
and possible segregation of persons suspected of being on a hunger 
strike.69 The standards also encourage administrators to attempt to 
obtain the consent of the detainee before implementing any medical 
 
careful, considered, voluntary decision based on a principled position—and not as a 
response to mental illness—the inmate should be permitted to continue. 
Id. 
 64. Id. The guidelines recognize that many cases “suggest the contrary; i.e., that 
correctional officials have a duty not to allow an individual to die” and recommend “[u]ntil this 
issue is settled, correctional and medical authorities would do well to have a prior written policy 
and to seek a court order when confronted with a serious hunger-striking inmate.” Id. 
 65. The publication includes a disclaimer that states, “Points of view or opinions stated in 
this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or 
policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.” Id. at copyright page. For a discussion of official 
United States Department of Justice policies, see infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 66. The former INS has been absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security. 
Department of Homeland Security, History, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_ 
0133.shtm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). The INS detention standards now fall under the United 
States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, About ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 
2007). 
 67. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, INS DETENTION STANDARD: 
HUNGER STRIKES 1 (2000), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/partners/dro/opsmanual/hunger.pdf 
[hereinafter INS HUNGER STRIKES]. 
 68. Id. The standards define a hunger strike as, “[a] voluntary fast undertaken as a means 
of protest; medical evaluation of hunger-striking detainee is standard after 72 hours or earlier, at 
the discretion of medical staff.” U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, INS 
DETENTION STANDARD: DEFINITIONS 5 (2000), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/partners/dro/ 
opsmanual/defin.pdf [hereinafter INS DEFINITIONS].  
 69. INS HUNGER STRIKES, supra note 67, at 2–3. They also include a “monitoring 
instrument” consisting of a list of questions that should be marked “yes” or “no” when 
examining a detainee suspected of hunger striking. Id. at 3. 
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treatment.70 Currently, a new rule has been proposed by the Bureau 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.71 This rule would 
supersede the Detention Standard for Hunger Strikes. 
On the federal prison landscape, the Bureau of Prisons has 
implemented regulations for “the medical and administrative 
management of inmates who engage in hunger strikes.”72 The Bureau 
of Prisons created the regulations in 1980 and they were amended in 
1994.73 The regulations require observation, evaluation of the 
inmate’s mental and physical condition, and delivery of food and 
water to the inmate.74 One section of the regulations addresses a 
hunger-striking inmate’s refusal to accept treatment when the 
inmate’s life or health is in danger, stating, “[T]he physician shall 
give consideration to forced medical treatment of the inmate.”75 
C. Legislative Forays into Managing Prison Hunger Strikes 
The ACA and NCCHC standards give great deference to 
“applicable laws and regulations.”76 While many states may have 
 
 70. Id. The standards provide, “Forced medical treatment shall be administered in 
accordance with applicable laws; and only after medical staff determines that the detainee’s life 
or permanent health is at risk.” Id. In addition, the standards provide a procedure for how to 
properly seek approval from the INS District Director, the Division of Immigration Health 
Services Chief of Medical Staff, the INS District Counsel, and the United States Attorneys 
Office to determine whether a court hearing or INS authorization to implement force-feeding is 
necessary. Id. at 4. 
 71. Procedures for Detainee Hunger Strikes, 71 Fed. Reg. 22,714 (Apr. 24, 2006). The 
comment period for this proposed rule ended in December 2006. Id. 
 72. 28 C.F.R. §§ 549.60–.66 (2005). The code defines an inmate on hunger strike as 
follows:  
When he or she communicates that fact to staff and is observed to be refraining from 
eating for a period of time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours; or (b) When staff observe 
the inmate to be refraining from eating for a period in excess of 72 hours. When staff 
consider it prudent to do so, a referral for medical evaluation may be made without 
waiting 72 hours. 
Id. § 549.61. 
 73. Id. §§ 549.60–.66. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. § 549.65. The section also states, “When, after reasonable efforts, or in an 
emergency preventing such efforts, a medical necessity for immediate treatment of a life or 
health threatening situation exists, the physician may order that treatment be administered 
without the consent of the inmate.” Id. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 52 and 60. 
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policies on how to respond to inmate hunger strikes,77 most policies 
do not appear to be codified in the state codes.78 An exception is 
Illinois Public Act 093-0928.79 The law provides:  
If a physician providing medical care to a committed person on 
behalf of the Department advises the chief administrative 
officer that the committed person's mental or physical health 
has deteriorated as a result of the cessation of ingestion of food 
or liquid to the point where medical or surgical treatment is 
required to prevent death, damage, or impairment to bodily 
functions, the chief administrative officer may authorize such 
medical or surgical treatment.80 
The statute was amended in 2004; instead of requiring a court 
order to force-feed an inmate, prison administrators could now force-
feed upon the recommendation of a physician.81 This change was 
partially in response to Millard.82 
Although most federal regulations concerning prisons come from 
the Bureau of Prisons, Congress has taken some action that may 
affect the treatment of hunger strikes. The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),83 was passed in 2000. 
Section 2000cc-1 of RLUIPA addresses the “[p]rotection of religious 
exercise of institutionalized persons.”84 In cases where the 
 
 77. Bennett, supra note 4, at 1161. Bennett reports that, “many corrections officials 
indicate that broad principles such as the need to preserve life might lead them to consider 
force-feeding in an individual case.” Id. at 1161 n.6. 
 78. Several states include policies on “The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment” in their 
administrative rules. The Oregon Department of Corrections rules require informed consent for 
any “invasive health care procedure with major adverse health risks,” except “[i]nformed 
consent is not required in a medical emergency if the inmate is unable to give or to refuse 
consent and there is an immediate threat to the life or irreversible bodily harm to the 
inmate . . . .” OR. ADMIN. R. 291-124-0080 (1999). 
 79. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-2 (2004). 
 80. Id. § 3-6-2(e-5). 
 81. Kurt Erickson, Hunger Strikes Drop at Prisons, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), 
July 23, 2005, at A3. 
 82. Id. “The proposal, which received unanimous support in the General Assembly last 
year, was aimed at addressing situations such as a hunger strike in 2002 by a former Pontiac 
Correctional Center inmate [Eldon Millard].” Id.; see supra notes 37–40 and accompanying 
text. 
 83. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 
(2000). 
 84. Id. § 2000cc-1. As seen in O'Malley v. Litscher, No. 04-C-0032, 2005 WL 1845110 
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government “impose[s] a substantial burden on the religious exercise 
of a person residing in or confined to, an institution,” RLUIPA 
substitutes a requirement of a “compelling government interest” and 
imposes a “least restrictive means” tests in place of the legitimate 
penological interest requirement set forth in Turner.85 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals examined the effect RLUIPA on the Turner 
test in Warsoldier v. Woodford.86 The court explained that the Turner 
standard was replaced with a higher standard in the case of 
regulations that are found to “substantially burden” an inmate’s 
religious freedoms.87 In order to further RLUIPA’s purpose of 
“protecting institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend 
to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the 
government’s permission and accommodation of their religion”88 the 
Turner standard does not apply when inmates exercise their religious 
freedoms. In 2005 the case of O'Malley v. Litscher addressed the 
application of RLUIPA to hunger strikes.89 The Eastern District 
Court of Wisconsin considered an inmate’s claims that force-feeding 
violated his religious rights under RLUIPA.90 The court pointed out 
that O’Malley claimed his refusal to eat was a religious fast, while 
prison administrators considered it a hunger strike.91 Concluding that 
the prison health officials met the higher standard, the court said 
“[t]he defendant[] had a compelling governmental interest in keeping 
the plaintiff alive and maintaining security, safety and good order in 
 
(E.D. Wis. July 29, 2005), “religious exercise” may include religious fasting, which may be 
interpreted by prison officials as a hunger strike. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. See generally Benjamin Pi-wei Liu, Comment, A Prisoner’s 
Right to Religious Diet Beyond the Free Exercise Clause, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2004) 
(recommending that “[t]he simultaneous consideration of multiple constitutional principles 
could better guide judicial decisions in prison religious diet cases”). 
 86. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 87. Id. at 997–98. 
 88. Id. at 994 (citation omitted); see also Andreola v. Wisconsin, No. 04-C-0186, 2005 
WL 2233995, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 2, 2005) (noting that “Congress passed RLUIPA, which 
in effect overruled the Court’s decisions in Turner and O’Lone as they apply to prison 
regulations or policies that impact on the religious practices of inmates”). 
 89. O'Malley, 2005 WL 1845110. 
 90. Id. at *1. The court dismissed many of O’Malley’s claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because it determined that the plaintiff was seeking reversal of state court decisions 
in federal court. Id. at *9. Only those claims not seeking a reversal of a state court judgment 
were able to be brought before the district court. Id. at *11. 
 91. Id. at *1 n.1. 
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the prison. Given the circumstances, the defendant[] applied the least 
restrictive means in furthering those ends.”92 
III. THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT AUTHORIZATION TO COPE WITH 
HUNGER-STRIKING INMATES 
Turner’s rule for determining when prison authorities can infringe 
on inmates’ constitutional rights can be applied to inmate hunger 
strikes. As illustrated above, the competing sides in the question of 
what authority prison administrators have under the law to force-feed 
hunger-striking inmates each have compelling arguments. An 
inmate’s argument for why he should be allowed to continue with his 
hunger strike and not be force-fed is one of constitutional rights.93 In 
 
 92. Id. at *19. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendant prison 
administrators. Id. The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act could also have some 
impact on how state prisons respond to hunger strikes. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997j (2000). Section 1997a provides a method for the Attorney 
General to “institute a civil action” against a state for subjecting an institutionalized person to 
“egregious or flagrant conditions” that:  
[D]eprive such persons of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States causing such persons to suffer grievous 
harm, and that such deprivation is pursuant to a pattern or practice of resistance to the 
full enjoyment of such rights, privileges, or immunities. 
Id. § 1997a. If the preceding conditions were met it could allow the Attorney General to 
investigate a state prison’s treatment of hunger striking prisoners. However, the Act specifically 
declines to authorize standards of health care. Id. § 1997i. This suggests that the impact of 
§ 1997a of the Act is primarily restricted to the rare case in which a state prison’s procedures 
are so extreme as to be “egregious or flagrant.” Id. § 1997a. Section 1997e has an effect on the 
steps a prisoner has to take in order to bring a § 1983 civil rights complaint against a prison 
because it requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing suit. Id. 
§ 1997e; see Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners Under 
Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935 (1986). 
 93. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 748–52. The question of which rights are violated has 
been answered in different ways, depending on the motivating factors behind the prisoner’s 
hunger strike. One issue raised by prisoners is the right to privacy. Bennett, supra note 4, at 
1163 (“[This] Note argues that force-feeding infringes on the fundamental liberty interest of 
privacy, that prisoners retain the right to this fundamental interest, and that prisoners must 
therefore be accorded procedural due process before the state can force-feed them.”). Another 
issue is First Amendment rights, when viewing hunger striking as “speech-action.” Sneed & 
Stonecipher, supra note 7, at 550 (“The ultimate test of the speech-action dichotomy as it 
relates to symbolic speech, however, may be the fasting of prison inmates who use hunger 
strikes to protest the conditions of their confinement or to make political statements.”). 
Additional issues are introduced by the Eighth Amendment and the consideration of equal 
protection. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 524. 
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the case of prison administrators, courts look at such interests as 
prison security, maintenance of order, preservation of life, duty to 
provide medical care, the interests of the state in carrying out justice, 
and suicide prevention to justify administrative intrusion on an 
inmate’s decision to engage in a hunger strike.94 
As Turner is recognized as the prevailing test for several types of 
constitutional complaints by inmates,95 it makes sense to analyze 
force-feeding in terms of the four factors Turner used to determine 
whether a regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests.”96 The first factor asks whether there is “a valid rational 
connection” between force-feeding and the government interest put 
 
 94. See Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383–88 (Cal. 1993) (considering 
preservation of life, prevention of suicide, “maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession,” “protecting innocent third parties,” and “maintaining an orderly and secure penal 
institution.”); Singletary v. Costello, 665 So. 2d 1099, 1105–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(considering preservation of life, prevention of suicide, protection of innocent third parties, 
“maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession,” and “maintaining an orderly 
and secure penal institution”); Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715, 716 (Ga. 1982) (considering 
“duty to protect the health of those who are incarcerated in the state penal system,” and 
preservation of human life); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96 (N.H. 1984) (considering “the 
preservation of internal order and discipline and the maintenance of institutional security” and 
“preservation of human life and the preservation of suicide”); Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 
N.Y.S.2d 623, 625–27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (considering preventing suicide, preservation of 
life, and prison security and administration); Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1990) (considering preservation of life, prevention of suicide, and enforcement of 
“prison security, order, and discipline”); Laurie v. Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 808 (R.I. 1995) 
(considering preservation of life and prevention of suicide); McNabb v. Dep’t of Corr., 112 
P.3d 592, 594–95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (considering “preserving life and preventing suicide” 
and “internal order and discipline, as well as maintaining institutional security”); State ex rel. 
White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 57 (W. Va. 1982) (considering a test from Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977): preservation of life, 
prevention of suicide, “protection of interests of innocent third parties,” and “maintenance of 
physicians’ ethical integrity”). See generally Sneed & Stonecipher, supra note 7, at 554–60; 
Bennett, supra note 4, at 1183–219; Greenberg, supra note 7, at 752–70; Ludwig, supra note 7, 
at 174–81; Silver, supra note 11, at 642–56. 
 95. See supra note 36. 
 96. The Court did not rule on how much weight should be placed on each of the factors. 
MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 28. Mushlin suggests that if the first factor (analyzing whether there 
is a valid rational connection between the regulation and the prison administration’s interest) 
falls in favor of the inmate, the regulation should fail. Id. at 40. He argues that since the purpose 
of the overall test is to find a reasonable relationship to the penological interest, “logic compels 
the conclusion that, if the first test is not satisfied, there is no reason for a court to resolve the 
remaining three.” Id. The Supreme Court has also noted that the absence of ready alternatives is 
“not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot 
down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
90–91 (1987). 
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forth to justify it.97 If one governmental interest is the preservation of 
the inmate’s life, and the hunger strike has progressed to the point 
where the inmate’s life is in danger, the court would likely hold this 
connection is valid and rational, as was done in Fort.98 If prison 
administrators do not take action to feed the inmate and he continues 
to fast he will die, and his life will not be preserved.  
The second factor asks whether there is an alternative way for the 
prisoner to exercise his right.99 This factor depends on which right the 
inmate is exercising by engaging in the hunger strike. Many inmates 
claim a right of privacy allows them to continue to fast.100 When 
looking to alternative methods to express this right at least one court 
has held that there are no alternatives to the specific right to privacy 
claimed.101 The second factor would then fall in favor of the inmate. 
In the easier case of a hunger strike as a form of speech-action, the 
court may point out that the prisoner could express his protests 
verbally or in writing.102 In this instance the second factor would fall 
in favor of the prison administrators. 
When analyzing the third factor, a court examines the impact that 
allowing the expressed right to continue would have on the guards, 
other prisoners, and the general allocation of prison resources.103 
 
 97. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Court “found it important to inquire whether prison 
regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without 
regard to the content of the expression.” Id. at 90. 
 98. In Fort, the court did not analyze the four Turner factors, but found the Department of 
Corrections had legitimate penological interests in seeking to force-feed the hunger striking 
inmate. People ex rel. Dep’t of Corr. v. Fort, 815 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
 99. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. The Court said the presence of “other avenues” for the 
inmate to exercise his rights weighs in favor of prison administrators as “courts should be 
particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in 
gauging the validity of the regulation.” Id. at 90 (citations omitted). 
 100. See, e.g., Ansbacher, supra note 7, at 118–28 (comparing a hunger striking inmate’s 
privacy, or personhood, rights to various state interests in Zant, Von Holden, and White).  
 101. The United States District Court for the Western District of New York found that, 
“under the second Turner factor, there is no alternative means for inmates to exercise their right 
to privacy. Once it is lost, it is lost forever.” Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 733 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); cf. Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
“alternative means” factor is not relevant due to the nature of Veney’s equal protection claim). 
 102. See Greenberg, supra note 7, at 748 (“Because hunger strikers can express their views 
through alternative means, the First Amendment will not protect them from being force-fed.”). 
First Amendment challenges are a primary application of Turner. MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 27.  
 103. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Court said, “When accommodation of an asserted right 
will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be 
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Prison hunger strikes are often designed to put pressure on prison 
authorities. The use of a hunger strike as a bargaining tactic may have 
a negative impact on the morale of the guards. Other inmates may be 
encouraged to engage in hunger strikes, especially if they see that the 
first inmate’s hunger strike is having an effect on guards and other 
prison authorities, or is gaining attention from the media.104 There are 
also medical expenses involved in caring for a starving inmate that 
affect prison resources.105  
Finally, a court applying the fourth factor in Turner would analyze 
whether there are ready alternatives to force-feeding that prison 
officials could adopt to satisfy the interests met in ending hunger 
strikes.106 One alternative may be to submit to the prisoner’s 
demands, but this alternative would conflict with the penological 
interests of serving justice and prison safety, and would adversely 
affect the third factor by encouraging other inmates to adopt the 
behavior.107  
In general, when the hunger strike has progressed to the point 
where the inmate’s life is in jeopardy, a policy of force-feeding the 
inmate seems to meet the Turner factors and pass the test for a 
reasonable relationship to legitimate penological interests. However, 
the specific facts of some cases may affect these factors and tip the 
balance of the test in the other direction. For example, a court 
applying the Turner test may find that force-feeding does not pass the 
test when force-feeding is applied as a deterrent to hunger strikes for 
the mere “convenience” of the prison administrators rather than for 
 
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials.” Id. This would seem 
to hold true in the case of hunger strikes, where what is perceived as a successful protest by one 
inmate may inspire others to adopt the behavior, thus creating a larger burden on prison 
officials. 
 104. See Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (“In the 
present case, the uncontradicted testimony shows that if Kallinger would be permitted to die, 
other patients at Farview would almost certainly copy the same tactic, manipulating the system 
to get a change of conditions, possibly resulting in their death.”). 
 105. See, e.g., In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96 (N.H. 1984) (finding that inmate’s “simple” 
desire to continue his hunger strike “may jeopardize prison discipline and tax prison resources 
. . . [and] also [does] not reflect the predicament which will be placed at the doorstep of prison 
personnel and the medical profession when and if he reaches the point of being alive yet 
comatose”).  
 106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 107. See supra note 103. 
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more legitimate state interests such as safety. The ability of prison 
administrators to force-feed stops inmates from using hunger strikes 
as leverage and allows prison administrators to avoid the burden of 
devoting significant medical resources to treating otherwise healthy 
individuals.  
Application of the Turner standards shows that force-feeding is 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” when a 
hunger strike progresses to the point where the inmate’s life is in 
danger. While Turner does not govern every type of constitutional 
challenge,108 its integration into prison regulations regarding the 
treatment of hunger strikes would help reduce challenges to the 
constitutionality of force-feeding. 
IV. STANDARDS SHOULD BE ARTICULATED FOR PRISON 
ADMINISTRATORS REGARDING RESPONSES TO HUNGER-STRIKING 
INMATES 
This Note has examined the three major areas that define the 
authorization that governs prison administrators when they respond to 
inmate hunger strikes. This Note now recommends that these three 
areas of authority should combine to create some consistent 
boundaries within this controversial area. One of the penological 
organizations previously mentioned should develop a set of detailed 
standards that provide prison administrators with guidelines for when 
and how to respond to inmate hunger strikes, including at what point 
administrators may intervene with force-feeding. These standards 
should be developed in consideration of the factors provided in 
Turner to determine when prison regulations can infringe on an 
inmate’s constitutional rights.  
A. Penological Organizations Should Create Standards for Inmate 
Hunger Strikes Based on Turner 
Penological organizations such as the ACA and NCCHC do not 
have specific standards for responding to hunger strikes.109 
 
 108. See supra note 36. 
 109. See supra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. 
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Information about rendering medical attention without consent defers 
to applicable state and federal laws and regulations in the standards 
formed by these organizations.110  
Prison authorities could benefit from standardized hunger strike 
procedures. Therefore, one of the leading penological organizations, 
like the ACA, should create a set of standards that states could adopt. 
In doing so, the organization should use Turner as the threshold of 
where force-feeding is permitted. This would be at the point where 
penological interests most clearly meet the test–when the prisoner’s 
life is in danger.111 This high standard would also align with the 
organization’s commitment to the theory of informed consent and 
general respect for inmate rights.112  
B. State Legislatures and the Federal Bureau of Prisons Should 
Adopt the New Standards 
If adopted, these standards would help create equality among state 
and federal prison systems in response to hunger strikes, giving 
inmates the assurance that they would be treated consistently in any 
prison in the country.113 In addition, prison administrators would feel 
secure in the knowledge that they are acting in accordance with the 
recommendations of a highly respected penological organization. 
Like the ACA and NCCHC standards for health care, the former 
INS and Bureau of Prisons hunger strike standards also maintain that 
force-feeding should be conducted in accordance with applicable 
laws. The Bureau of Prisons regulations generally concur with the 
results under the Turner test, allowing intervention at the point where 
the inmate’s “life or health” is in danger.114 The former INS standards 
allow the detainee to exercise his choice not to eat until the point 
where his choice creates a risk to his “life or permanent health.”115 
 
 110. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 51, at 30; NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, 
supra note 58, at 133. 
 111. See supra Part III. 
 112. See supra note 52. 
 113. Stockstill, supra note 3 (claiming failure by prison administrators to follow proper 
protocol for treatment of hunger strikes). 
 114. 28 C.F.R. § 549.65 (2005). 
 115. INS HUNGER STRIKES, supra note 67, at 3. Detention centers seem to be the only 
division that is addressing the issue of hunger strikes in a thorough and pro-active manner. It 
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There is a question of the extent to which the definition of “danger to 
health” applies. Therefore, federal prisons could also benefit by the 
integration of the Turner test into the Bureau of Prisons regulations 
or by adopting the new standards. This would require clarification of 
when “danger to health” merits the consideration of force-feeding, 
which as integrated into the new standards formed under Turner, 
would be at the point where the inmate’s life was in danger.116 The 
benefit of integrating the Turner test to the regulations would be the 
confidence on the part of prison administrators that they are 
responding in a manner that gives the requisite deference to inmates’ 
constitutional rights as required by the United States Supreme Court 
while preserving their interests in the situation.  
V. CONCLUSION 
By framing the standards in terms of the requirements set out by 
Turner, penological organizations would be acknowledging the 
constitutional concerns inherent in hunger strikes by allowing force-
feeding only when the prison administrators’ desire to do so is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests as defined by 
the United States Supreme Court. This standardization would allow 
prison administrators to respond to hunger strikes in a consistent 
manner without fear of frequent constitutional challenges. This 
thoughtful and consistent approach would also allow the regulations 
to be clearly explained to both state and federal inmates before they 
engage in hunger strikes, thus helping to increase the inmates’ 
knowledge of how the administration will react to their refusal to eat. 
Forward knowledge may discourage some prisoners from engaging in 
hunger strikes at all.117  
The integration of the reasonableness test in Turner into response 
standards for prisons may leave some prisoners feeling that their 
rights have been violated. It also cannot insulate prison authorities 
 
should be interesting to compare the new ICE hunger strike standards being developed to both 
the former INS standards and the Bureau of Prisons regulations. 
 116. This would have the effect of making the current phrasing redundant. 
 117. See generally Erickson, supra note 81 (suggesting that new law streamlining the 
process for force-feeding might have a deterrent effect on prisoners).  
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from every type of constitutional challenge. However, if implemented 
correctly, these standards will help demonstrate that leaders in the 
penological field have considered inmate rights and have attempted 
to create regulations that give inmates as much deference as possible 
while still meeting legitimate state concerns. This would help to 
create some stability in an area that has been inconsistent for decades. 
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